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Survey Articles
The Liberal Democratic Party at 50: Sources 
of Dominance and Changes in the Koizumi Era
Patrick KÖLLNER*
More than 50 years after its founding, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is still going strong. It has become 
the dominant party within a democratic setting. How did the LDP manage to cling to its dominant position for 
such a long time? And to what extent has the LDP changed colours under the leadership of Koizumi Jun’ichiro? 
This survey article attempts to answer these questions by focussing on the three dimensions of LDP dominance: 
electoral, parliamentary, and executive dominance. It argues that clientelist politics explain a good deal of the 
success of the LDP in the past. Such an orientation however became decreasingly effective and sustainable in a 
political environment that has changed significantly since the early 1990s. In the Koizumi era, the LDP managed to 
rise again to the challenges posed to its dominance by appealing directly to voters, by optimizing electoral 
cooperation, and by making efforts to centralize policymaking. Whether these more recent approaches to 
maintaining LDP dominance can be sustained, however, remains an open question.
1. Introduction
In November 2005, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) celebrated its 50th anniversary. Apart
from a short period in 1993–1994, the LDP governed Japan during these 50 years, most of the time
on its own. It is not too much to say that the LDP has become the dominant party within a demo-
cratic setting. Whereas dominant parties in other democracies have lost their grip on power or have
disappeared altogether, the LDP continues to be the most popular party in Japan, dominating both
the parliament and the executive.
What explains the success of the LDP? And to what extent has the LDP changed colours under the
leadership of Koizumi Jun’ichiro? Based on an examination of the various dimensions of LDP domi-
nance, I will address these questions in this article. I will argue that clientelist politics played a major
role in maintaining the electoral and parliamentary dominance of the LDP until well into the 1990s
and that factional dynamics within the party helped to maintain executive dominance during this
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244 Patrick KÖLLNER
period. The 1990s, however, saw manifold changes in Japan’s political system that challenged the
dominance of the LDP. These challenges are highlighted in section 4 of the article. New approaches
in the Koizumi era to overcome these challenges by bringing new voters into the party’s fold, opti-
mizing electoral cooperation, and creating a more coherent party are discussed in section 5. A short
section on the LDP’s perspectives concludes the article, but I will begin with a brief conceptual and
analytical introduction to the topic of dominant parties.
2. Defining and Analyzing Dominant Parties
Why do dominant parties such as the LDP arouse interest? Two reasons can be suggested: one is more
academic and the other is a practical explanation. If we understand political science as ‘the systematic anal-
ysis of relationships of power and influence among human beings’ (Dahl et al. 2004: 377), dominant par-
ties are of particular interest because of the high degree of power and influence they possess. How they
use this power and influence is of practical importance to citizens in the countries concerned.
But what exactly is a dominant party? More than 50 years ago, Maurice Duverger defined such a
party as follows: 
A party becomes a dominant party when it represents a whole epoch, when its ideas, its methods, its whole
style are identical with those of an epoch. A ruling party is one that is believed to be one. Even the enemies
of a dominant party, even citizens who do not vote for it, acknowledge its superior status and influence;
they deplore it, but admit it (Duverger 1959: 317).
Yet there is no consensus on the yardstick to be applied for contenders to the title of ‘dominant
party’. Diverging opinions exist with regard to the necessary length of time in government, the nec-
essary share of seats and votes, or the necessity of ideological hegemony of the party in question (cf.
Bogaards 2004: 174–176). But even the most comprehensive list of requirements for a dominant
party, put together by Brendan O’Leary, has been widely met by the LDP. O’Leary (1994: 4) postu-
lates that a dominant party in democratic systems has to exhibit the following characteristics: 
First, it...must be dominant in number: it must regularly win more seats in parliamentary or congressional
elections than its opponents....Secondly, this party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position. It must be
able to stay in government on a regular basis. If it must share power with smaller parties...it is nevertheless
the key agent in the political system, with privileged access to the key executive and legislative posts.
Thirdly...a dominant party must be chronologically pre-eminent. It must govern continuously for a long
time, [regardless of whether] three or four general election victories [or one decade or more in power] are
the crucial benchmarks of dominance. Finally a dominant party must be ideologically dominant: it must be
capable of using government to shape public policy so that the nature of the state and the society over
which it presides is fundamentally changed.1
What are the specific challenges faced by dominant or would-be-dominant parties? Françoise
Boucek (1998) distinguishes three distinct dimensions or, from the viewpoint of the parties in ques-
tion, challenges. Such challenges exist for many parties, but dominant parties have to master them
over an extended period to stay in power. First, there is the dimension of electoral dominance, which
refers to the aspect of vote acquisition. Boucek (1998: 105) notes that ‘[d]ominant parties achieve
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
1. O’Leary’s list is based on Pempel (1990a: 3–4) who, however, does not state the necessity of ideological
dominance but simply talks of a national political agenda being shaped by ‘interlocking and mutually sup-
portive policies’.
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The Liberal Democratic Party at 50 245
electoral dominance by maximizing their electoral support. They aggregate broad segments of the
electorate through successful collective appeals (via issues and policies) and preference-accommodat-
ing strategies’. In other words, the dimension of electoral dominance is concerned with the question
of how parties attract a large number of voters to lay the basis for a hegemonic position in a country’s
party system.
The second dimension focuses on parliamentary dominance. Of interest is here how votes won in
parliamentary elections are translated into seats. This is for one a question of the mechanical aspects
of electoral systems (i.e. the concrete modes of transforming votes into seats) and the instrumental
aspects of electoral systems (including the design and redesign of electoral systems with the aim of
ensuring as many seats as possible for the largest party). Of potential importance in this respect is also
the dominant party’s cooperation with other parties within the framework of electoral alliances. Of
sometimes even greater importance can be how other parties in the relevant party system deal with
the challenge of electoral coordination and cooperation. Clearly, maintaining a dominant position in
parliament is easier when the opposition does not work together in terms of unified candidacies and
voter mobilization (Boucek 1998: 107; Nyblade 2005: 3, 15–16).
Thirdly, there is the dimension of executive dominance. For dominant parties without a parlia-
mentary majority of their own, the question of entering and maintaining coalitions is vital in this
regard. In most general terms, the positioning of a party in or near the centre of the relevant ideo-
logical spectrum makes entering coalitions easier. For dominant parties with a majority of their
own, internal coordination can become a vital question. Intra-party groups, so-called factions, can
play a significant role in terms of managing dominant parties (Boucek 1998: 107–108; Nyblade
2005: 2–3, 15). Focussing on these three dimensions of dominance, I will now turn to the case of
the LDP.
3. Maintaining a Dominant Position Until the Early 1990s
As Guiseppe Di Palma (1990) notes, it is not easy to establish one-party dominance in democratic
systems.2 It is however even more difficult to retain dominance for an extended period. How do
dominant parties defy for such a long time ‘the inevitable rhythmic swing of the pendulum of the
voter’ (Nyblade 2005: 22)? With regard to both the electoral and the parliamentary dominance of
the Japanese Liberal Democrats, the importance of the electoral framework in Japan has repeatedly
been emphasized. Until 1993, the so-called single non-transferable voting system (SNTV) was used
in electoral districts with, on average, four Diet members.3 Under SNTV, Japanese parties aiming at
a majority of seats in parliament had to present more than one candidate in many electoral districts.
This led to coordination problems. If a party nominates too many candidates in a given district, the
collective failure of the candidates in question (so-called tomodaore) could ensue. Some scholars have
argued that the LDP was particularly apt at solving its coordination problems by means of effective
nomination strategies (e.g. Baerwald 1986: 50–51; Cox and Niou 1994; Cox and Rosenbluth
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
2. On the context and the origins of the LDP’s rise to power, see Pempel (1990a,b) and Lee (2004).
3. SNTV is a peculiar creature: it combines the decision rule of the majority principle at the local level with a relatively high
degree of proportionality at the national level. Under SNTV, every voter has a single vote, which she/he gives to a partic-
ular candidate. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes in a district are elected. ‘Excess votes’, votes going
beyond the number required for a candidate to get elected, cannot be transferred to another candidate of the same
party—hence ‘non-transferable’ voting system.
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246 Patrick KÖLLNER
1994).4 This argument has however to be put into perspective. For example, Ray Christensen and
Paul E. Johnson (1995) point out data problems leading to overestimations of the efficiency of LDP
nominations. Moreover, Christensen (2000) shows that when the opposition parties cooperated
partly or fully in national elections, they were sometimes even better able to coordinate their candi-
dates than the LDP. Such effective cooperation between two or more opposition parties remained,
however, restricted to individual elections between 1972 and 1990 (Baerwald 1986: 56–60; Johnson
2000; Baker and Scheiner 2004).
While nomination strategies under SNTV are not the ‘magic bullet’ for explaining the electoral
success of the LDP, another aspect of the old electoral system merits closer attention: SNTV gener-
ates incentives to pursue candidate-oriented vote-mobilization activities (cf. Carey and Shugart
1995; Grofman 1999). With regard to the Japanese case, the ability to engage in pork barrelling
proved to be an advantage for the ruling LDP, an advantage other parties did not or hardly possess at
all (Cox 1996, 1997; Scheiner 2005). Individual LDP candidates also reacted to the electoral system
and the challenge posed by the organizational support enjoyed by opposition parties [unions in the
case of the Socialist Party (JSP) and strong party organization in the case of the Communist Party
(JCP)] by institutionalizing personal support organizations, so-called koenkai.5 A well-functioning
koenkai was seen as a precondition for obtaining the necessary number of votes under SNTV—par-
ticularly in electoral districts where more than one candidate from a given party competed for votes.6
Even though many Socialist and Communist politicians also established koenkai in their electoral dis-
tricts, these personal support organizations usually did not reach the same scope and level of com-
plexity as those of LDP politicians (Masumi 1995: 347–48).7
One aspect of the electoral system that has been accorded prominence in terms of explaining the
parliamentary dominance of the LDP has been malapportionment. For example, Woodall (1999: 34,
35) argues that ‘[t]he blessings that SNTV bestowed upon the LDP are striking .... malapportion-
ment and disproportionality spawned by SNTV housed in middle-sized districts helped enable the
LDP to realize nearly four decades of unrivaled legislative hegemony’. In spite of changes in the size
and number of districts, substantial imbalances between electoral districts continued to exist in the
1990s. In numerous rural districts, only half as many votes as in urban districts were needed to get
elected (Woodall 1999: 33–34; Hrebenar 2000: 45–49).8 Christensen and Johnson (1995) show
however that malapportionment accounted for victories for the LDP camp only in two national elec-
tions (1979 and 1983). Its importance for maintaining LDP parliamentary dominance should thus
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
4. Optimal candidate nomination strategies have to be based on proper evaluations of vote potentials and thus learning
processes. Totally ‘rational’ nomination behaviour however seems impossible because of limited strategic capacity and
informational uncertainty (Baker and Scheiner 2004).
5. On the beginnings of koenkai, see Curtis (1971: 127–136) and Masumi (1995: 236–238). As Peng Er Lam (1994)
shows, koenkai have also been widespread in urban areas. For illustrative accounts of koenkai operations, see Ishikawa and
Hirose (1989: chap 3) and Bouissou (1998).
6. See Grofman (1999: 381) and the literature cited therein.
7. This weaker institutionalization was partly due to the long-time opposition status of both parties. Moreover, the resources of
labour unions (in the case of the JSP) and the party itself (in the case of the JCP) in terms of finance, personnel, and logistics
made it less necessary for such opposition politicians to build up personal support networks. In contrast to the LDP, there
were also far fewer electoral districts in which a number of JSP (let alone JCP) candidates competed against each other.
8. Many of these rural districts were bastions of the LDP, which—for understandable reasons—never showed much interest in
radical re-districting. It has to be noted though that the most severe imbalances between electoral districts have been reduced
since the early 1990s and that gerrymandering seems no longer possible (Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Christensen 2004).
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The Liberal Democratic Party at 50 247
not be exaggerated. As Gerald L. Curtis (1988: 51) suggests, the over-representation of rural dis-
tricts was simply a contributing factor to the electoral success of the LDP. It helped to cushion the
effects of rapid urbanization starting in the 1950s, which otherwise would have favoured the opposition
parties even more strongly.
While effective voter mobilization via pork barrelling and personalized support organizations can
be pointed out as the main local mechanisms for maintaining the LDP’s electoral dominance, we also
need to look at the central level of politics. Here, additional sources of both the LDP’s electoral and
the parliamentary dominance can be found. Some but not all of these can also be subsumed under
the label of ‘clientelist politics’. First, the party’s success in linking up with numerous interest groups
has to be mentioned. Well into the 1990s, the LDP was able to base itself on a ‘grand coalition’ of
different organizations (Okimoto 1988a). That many organized interests at the national level were
drawn towards the LDP is not really surprising: for many years the Liberal Democrats were the only
party which could not only formulate policies but also implement them and reward groups belong-
ing to its ‘grand coalition’. Even groups, which at first stood in opposition to the LDP, eventually
had to come to terms with the party if they did not want to be marginalized (Pempel 1990a: 27).
During its long rule, the LDP was able to firmly institutionalize the exchange of resources with
national support groups. Individual factions within the LDP cultivated links with particular interest
groups and industries. In particular, the powerful Tanaka faction and its successors entertained a vast
network of such relationships. Tanaka Kakuei referred to his faction as the ‘general hospital’ (sogo
byoin) that, by means of its pool of specialized doctors (i.e. faction members concentrating on partic-
ular policy areas), could deal with any problem. Tanaka can be ‘credited’ for perfecting ‘machine
style’ relations between the LDP and interest groups at both the national and the local levels.9 In
exchange for donations, new party members, and vote mobilization, national interest groups were
bestowed with direct influence upon government policy (via their representatives in parliament) or at
least indirect influence (via links to Diet members and faction leaders).
Yet, the exchange of political goods and services also involved broader parts of the population. As
argued nearly 20 years ago by Daniel I. Okimoto (1988b), the LDP did not only target organized
groups by means of clientelistic exchange, patronage, and a general pro-business orientation but also
sought generalized voter support. A number of policies were oriented towards the broad and diffuse
segment of non-organized voters. For example, welfare, environmental, and other policies aimed at
improving the quality of life. Voters targeted by these measures included white-collar employees,
housewives, the self-employed, and young inhabitants of urban areas. In the 1970s, in particular, the
LDP demonstrated an astounding ability to adapt its policies to changing social needs (Stockwin
1999: 145; Pempel 1982).10
Mention also has to be made of the successful crisis management of the LDP. As Kent Calder
(1988) has shown, the LDP repeatedly managed to avert a loss of power by securing important voter
... . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
9. A vivid description of Tanaka’s approach to dealing with interest groups can be found in Johnson (1995: 183–211).
10. An interesting question is whether voters in Japan also rewarded the LDP for good economic performance and punished
it for bad economic performance. The comparative literature on ‘economic voting’ shows that the strength of the linkage
between economics and vote choice differs not only across countries and between elections but is also contingent on insti-
tutional context factors. With regard to Japan, Steven R. Reed and Gregory G. Brunk (1984) found that economic factors
influenced election outcomes only in the post-oil crisis period (1975–1980). Christopher J. Anderson and Jun Ishii
(1997) claim that the performance of the domestic economy did not affect electoral support for the LDP in the period of
1958–1992, but that openness to trade hurt the party in national elections.
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248 Patrick KÖLLNER
groups through distributive political measures such as tax gifts, subsidies, or the introduction of wel-
fare-oriented policy instruments. Finally, external factors also helped the LDP to maintain domi-
nance. The oppositional left, clinging to positions often at odds with reality, made achieving
parliamentary dominance comparatively easy for the LDP until the early 1990s.11 The increasing
fragmentation of the opposition since the 1960s12 and its only temporary electoral cooperation at
the national level likewise contributed to reducing the chances of the JSP-led opposition to assume
power.
Challenges to the LDP in the area of executive dominance centred primarily on intra-party man-
agement. Until the early 1990s, the LDP did not have to share power with another party for long.
Only between 1983 and 1986, the LDP was forced to enter a coalition with the New Liberal Club
(NLC), a group of reform-oriented former LDP Diet members. However, even during this brief
period, key posts remained with the LDP: the NLC was represented in government by only one min-
ister (Stockwin 2003: 188). Thanks to its majority in the parliament, the LDP was also able to dom-
inate committees in both the Lower and the Upper House until the mid-1970s and again in the
1980s. As far as Diet voting was concerned, tight party discipline was maintained in nearly every
instance. The main locus of policy-making was located anyway in LDP party organs rather than in
the Diet. The party was thus able to pre-structure the legislative process. Nevertheless from the mid-
1970s onwards, the LDP sought to reduce frictions with opposition parties over controversial bills
by means of inter-party consultations (Mochizuki 1982; Richardson 127–151: chap 6; Stockwin
1999: 113–121; Fukumoto 2000).
Being in possession of parliamentary majorities most of the time, the main challenge the LDP
faced in the executive dimension did not concern coordination processes in the cabinet or the Diet,
but rather intra-party management. Here, factions (habatsu) played a major role. These increasingly
institutionalized power groups assumed tasks in the areas of candidate nomination, the acquisition of
funds, and the allocation of party and government posts. The factional system inside the LDP was
guided by a set of informal norms that determined in particular how cabinet and party posts would
be distributed according to criteria of proportionality and seniority (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 66–73;
Curtis 1988: 80–116; Kohno 1992).
From the 1970s onwards, the LDP’s institutionalized factional system served as an effective func-
tional equivalent of formalized procedures and norms of party management. Arguably, the factional
system contributed to the channelling and the stabilization of competition and the flow of informa-
tion inside the LDP. Informal rules on how party and cabinet posts were to be allocated made the
political careers of LDP Diet members more foreseeable and helped to reduce uncertainty. Intra-
party tensions on matters of personnel could thus often be reduced to the unavoidable minimum. In
sum, institutionalized informal rules had an integrative effect largely counteracting the natural cen-
trifugal tendencies of factionalist party fragmentation (Reed 1991; Richardson 1997: 63–68; 2001).
The institutionalized factional system also served as a sort of a ‘checks-and-balances mechanism’
vis-à-vis the power of the president and the executive of the LDP. From the viewpoint of efficiency
and accountability, this can be judged negatively, but inside the LDP, this restraining of the party’s
... . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
11. This it not to deny that the Marxism propounded by the JCP and the JSP was open to flexible interpretations (cf. Johnson
2000: 24–56).
12. In 1960, the Democratic Socialist Party [Minshato (DSP)] emerged from the JSP, and in 1964, the neo-Buddhist
Komeito (Clean Government Party) was formed.
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The Liberal Democratic Party at 50 249
core executive was seen by many in a positive light. Changing factional alliances led to a fair degree
of pluralism inside Japan’s dominant party. From a normative perspective, this can be evaluated
ambivalently. Certainly, changing factional alliances are not a genuine alternative to real turnovers in
power. It can also be criticized that faction-induced pluralism did not increase the participatory
opportunities of Japanese citizens. In any case, faction-induced dynamic competition and the exist-
ence of intra-party alternatives—in the form of different faction leaders—increased the flexibility and
adaptability of the LDP in the face of new demands and challenges and thus contributed to the long
dominance of the party in Japanese politics (Curtis 1988: 236; Reed 1991; Hrebenar and Nakamura
2000; Park 2001; Köllner 2006: 104–108).
4. Challenges to LDP Dominance Since the Early 1990s
As Duverger noted many years ago, every dominant party carries within itself the seeds of its own
destruction. Long-term rule can lead to a party’s loss of vitality: ‘To the same degree that dominance
stabilises political life, it also makes it tensionless. The dominant party ... calcifies’ (Duverger 1959:
319). Moreover, patronage-based strategies aimed at staying in power can turn over time into a boo-
merang by undermining the cohesion, the principles, the autonomy, the flexibility, and finally the
ability of parties to win votes (Warner 1997).
Japan’s LDP has not been immune to such dynamics. The chain of large-scale corruption scandals
in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a warning sign in this regard.13 In the end, however, it was an
intra-party conflict—and thus a problem in the realm of executive dominance—which brought the
LDP down in 1993. After parts of the former Tanaka faction left the party, the LDP lost its majority
in the July 1993 Lower House election. A seven-party coalition led by Hosokawa Morihiro was able
to assume power.14 But after only 10 months in opposition, the LDP benefited from tensions inside
the coalition government which brought the party, assisted by its former political adversary, the
Socialists (now Social Democrats), back into government. Whether a longer period out of power
would have led the LDP to a fate similar to that of Italy’s former dominant party, the Democrazia
Cristiana, remains a matter of speculation.
In 1996, the Liberal Democrats recovered the post of prime minister. The moderate ideological
orientation of the LDP now became a major advantage for the party in terms of executive domi-
nance. Forced by the loss of their own parliamentary majority into entering coalitions, the LDP
made the most out of its coalition potential by allying itself with the Social Democrats (1994–1998),
the New Komeito (since 1999), and some other smaller parties.15
The short intermezzo of the Hosokawa government however had long-term consequences.
Reforms enacted in early 1994 brought about a new hybrid electoral system, which—due to its
strong majoritarian component—makes turnovers in government easier. Moreover, the reform of
political financing contributed to a significant decline of donations by the corporate sector, which at
the same time was hit by Japan’s economic malaise. The introduction of the new electoral system and
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
13. See for example, Curtis (1999: 73–78, 85–87) on these corruption scandals.
14. The background of the LDP split and the establishment and fall of the following coalition government are discussed in
detail by Curtis (1999: 65–136).
15. Government coalitions in Japan since the mid-1990s have included the Shinto Sakigake (1994–1998), the Liberal Party
(1999–2000), and its splinter product, the New Conservative Party (2000–2003).
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new regulations concerning the financing of political activities weakened the central foundations on
which the LDP’s factions had been built. As a consequence, the intra-party groups lost cohesion and
influence (see also below).
An important external threat to LDP rule evolved in the form of the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ), which had been founded in 1996 and had absorbed a number of smaller parties in 1998, and
developed into a serious contender for power. The Lower House election of 2000 underlined the
vote-gathering potential of the DPJ. In terms of defending its electoral dominance, the LDP was by
now faced with a triple challenge. First, the DPJ proved to be an attractive alternative to the LDP.
The Democrats managed to gain ground under the proportional representation segment of the new
electoral system. In 2000, the DPJ won 47 of the 180 available seats; the LDP was only slightly more
successful with 56 seats. In the 300 single-member districts (SMDs), the DPJ was also able to gain
ground (cf. Reed 2003b). The DPJ was particularly successful in winning over unaffiliated voters
(mutohaso), which by now accounted for around 50% of the Japanese electorate (cf. Tanaka and
Martin 2003; Hashimoto 2004).
By the beginning of the new millennium, the LDP was in danger of becoming relegated to a rural
party that had to rely mainly on the incumbency advantage of many of its Diet members and links
with support groups at the local and national level (cf. Reed 2003b). In 2000, this combination was
still effective enough to capture, in conjunction with its junior coalition partners, a majority in the
Lower House. From a longer term perspective, it was however highly questionable whether this
combination of factors would suffice to remain in power. Two further challenges put the electoral
dominance of the LDP at risk. First, support groups at the national level were no longer able to
mobilize the number of votes they were able to muster in the past. The Upper House elections in
2001 clearly showed the declining effectiveness of the ‘organised vote’ (soshikihyo) (Köllner 2002).
Even though the DPJ, because of its links to unionized interests, was also affected by this trend, it had
less to lose as it had also been more effective in terms of compensating for this decline by mobilizing
unaffiliated voters.
A third challenge to LDP electoral dominance was potentially even more problematic than the
declining effectiveness of the ‘organised vote’. The problem was Japan’s stagnant economy. As the eco-
nomic pie was getting smaller in Japan, the LDP faced increasing problems with regard to rewarding
the members of its ‘grand coalition’. The glue binding together the LDP and its various interest groups
was bound to diminish in this process. During the latter half of the 1990s, LDP leaders were happy to
ignore this challenge and continued to engage in governmental largesse, which benefited traditional
party supporters. In view of the rising mountain of public debt, however, this approach was untenable.
In sum, the LDP’s electoral dominance was clearly under threat by the turn of the century.
In this kind of environment, the LDP selected in 2000 a new party leader: Mori Yoshiro. Mori’s
disastrous performance in office—his gaffes provided continuous fodder for the opposition—sent
cabinet support rates into free fall and imbued the party with a sense of crisis. To polish the image of
the LDP which has been tarnished by the back-room selection of Mori, the party decided that his
successor would be chosen in an open election in which the LDP’s regional federations would be
given increased voting power. Individual prefectural associations of the party decided to further the
democratic appeal of the election by having their respective votes decided by primaries. This trig-
gered a bandwagon effect, with many other prefectural associations following suit.16 Fearing a defeat
... . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
16. Personal interview with LDP deputy secretary general, Tokyo, October 2005.
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in the upcoming Upper House election in 2001, party members voted overwhelmingly for Koizumi
Jun’ichiro who appealed directly to them on the basis of his image of freshness and change. Koizumi’s
landslide win in the primaries induced a sufficient number of LDP Diet members to also vote for
him, ensuring his election as the party’s 20th president in April 2001 (cf. Lincoln 2002: 68–69).
5. The LDP in the Koizumi Era: New Answers in the Face of Challenged 
Dominance
With hindsight, the election of Koizumi proved extremely fortunate for the LDP. At a time when the
party had been on a downward slope, the new LDP president turned things around. Effectively,
Koizumi was instrumental to restoring the electoral dominance of the party. While he loosened, on
the one hand, existing clientelistic links by means of reducing state subsidies for public works
projects, privatizing public corporations, and so forth, Koizumi also brought new cohorts of voters
into the party’s fold. Koizumi managed to capture the imagination of the Japanese public by means
of snappy slogans and dramatizing politics. What set Koizumi apart from most former LDP leaders17
was that he appealed directly to the public. While critical Japanese observers have labelled Koizumi a
‘populist’ (cf. Kubota 2004; Kabashima and Steel 2005), admirers have praised him for his non-elitist,
unconventional demeanour, and use of easy-to-understand language (cf. Takase 2005).18 In any
case, popular support provided Koizumi with the necessary mandate to pursue his reform agenda.
In Koizumi’s reform agenda, the two pillars of a reform of Japan’s political economy and a reform
of this own party were closely interlinked. When Koizumi promised to destroy the LDP if it resisted
reform, what he meant was not the destruction of the party per se. Rather it meant the destruction of
the old-style LDP approach of nursing clientele relationships that had been perfected by former
Prime Minister Tanaka and his factional lineage. In some ways, Koizumi revived a fight that his polit-
ical mentor, former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978), had largely failed to win (Koba-
yashi 2005: 154–155; Yomiuri Shinbun Seiji-bu 2005: 11–12). The political rationale of what were
on the surface economic reforms—privatizing public corporations and postal services, reducing
wasteful public spending on infrastructure projects, devolving more power and independent tax
sources to the regional level—consisted of severing the traditional clientelistic links between Japan’s
dominant party and various interest groups. What this all boiled down to was a largely, if perhaps
only temporarily, successful attempt at reinventing the LDP. Koizumi instinctively understood that
after so many momentous changes in Japan and beyond in the 1990s—the collapse of the bubble
economy, the rise of information technology, the increased momentum of globalization, and the
unravelling of social and other ties in Japan—the LDP could not go on as if nothing had happened.
Koizumi’s popular appeals for reform were certainly in tune with the changing electoral game.
With the increasing importance of unaffiliated voters and the continued urbanization of Japan’s elec-
toral geography,19 the LDP could not hope to uphold its dominance in any sustainable way by sim-
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
17. Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–1987) being the other recent exception to the rule (cf. Krauss 2002).
18. It should be noted that Koizumi’s direct appeals to the people were also born out of necessity, as he could not bank on a
broad basis of intra-party support for his reform goals.
19. Based on census data regarding population density, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs determined in 2003 that a third
each of the country’s 300 local electoral districts were urban, rural, and ‘in between’ respectively. In purely dichotomous
terms (more urban or more rural), 187 electoral districts—that is well over 60% of the total—were on the urban side in
2003. For a detailed breakdown of districts, see Yomiuri Shinbun Tokyo Honsha Seron Chosabu Hensha (2004: 63–65).
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ply relying on personalized and clientelistic approaches. Sure enough, even after electoral reform,
koenkai of individual Diet members continue to be useful as permanent links to sympathizers and as
‘vote banks’ that are especially valuable in times of low election turnouts (Krauss and Pekkanen
2004; Köllner 2006: 188–191). The same applies broadly to linkages with national support groups.
However, such instruments are not very useful when it comes to capturing floating or unaffiliated
voters.
In view of the increasing unravelling of family, community, or corporate bonds which in the past
tied voters together,20 non-traditional instruments and mechanisms must increasingly be used for
mobilizing voters who are not core supporters of a given party or candidate. The most obvious way
for getting in touch with such voters is by means of audio-visual media. Since the mid-1980s and
increasingly so since the early 1990s, television in particular has changed the way politics is ‘con-
sumed’ by the Japanese public (Krauss and Nyblade 2005). Although the trend towards full-scale
‘mediatisation’ of politics is still a fairly recent one in Japan, its impact on political communications
and marketing is already profound (Klein 2006). Political parties have to professionalize their media
communication strategies to get their messages across. Television in particular puts party leaders and,
of course, the head of government into the spotlight. As Ellis S. Krauss (2002: 10, 12) notes, 
the personalization of the role [of the prime minister] is increasingly important to voters....He (or she) will
be much more central to party fortunes at the polls, but also the subject to increased scrutiny from media
and voters—leading to greater accountability but not necessarily more political stability. Skilful and attrac-
tive prime ministers will gain popularity and better results for their party; unskilful and unattractive ones
will find their terms quite short.
Among recent LDP leaders, Koizumi has demonstrated the greatest adeptness at dealing with the
media. He used television and the Internet21 to portray himself as the champion of reform and his
opponents within the LDP as ‘resistance forces’ stuck in the past. On numerous occasions, Koizumi
made use of powerful imagery transmitted by the media. He frequently depicted politics as a colour-
ful drama, managing to get even usually disinterested people involved in politics and to vote for the
LDP at election time.22 Whether Koizumi’s successors will demonstrate similar media skills remains,
however, to be seen.
Recent elections provide evidence about how the LDP managed to maintain parliamentary domi-
nance in the Koizumi era. Electoral cooperation between the LDP and its coalition partner, the New
Komeito, reached a high point in 2005. At the time of the 2000 general election, that is before Koi-
zumi took the helm of the LDP, electoral cooperation among the governing parties had been
restricted to minimizing the number of SMDs in which candidates of the parties competed with each
other for votes (cf. Reed 2003a: 54–55). Such coordination continued in the Lower House election
of 2003.23 More importantly, in that election, the New Komeito also asked its voters in most SMDs
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
20. In other words, Japan is witnessing the phenomenon of the ongoing process of individualization (‘psychological anarchy’
in the words of a former LDP secretary general interviewed by the author in October 2005). For illustrations of recent
social trends in Japan, see Nathan (2004).
21. In 2001, the Cabinet Public Relations Office began to email so-called lion heart newsletters focussing on Koizumi’s activ-
ities and thoughts. Until mid-2006, 220 such newsletters had been issued.
22. The general election in 2005 provided a perfect example of how an election can be framed by skilfully instrumentalizing
the media. For analytic accounts of this so-called drama-like election (gekijo senkyo), see Taniguchi et al. (2005) and Klein
(2006).
23. In fact, there was not a single electoral district in which candidates from the two parties competed head on.
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in which it did not field a candidate, to vote for the candidate of the LDP. As a result, more than 70%
of its voters complied. Individual LDP candidates thus benefited from up to 20,000 additional votes
per SMD.24 In 2005, finally there was nearly perfect electoral cooperation between the LDP and the
New Komeito. LDP candidates stood in 290 SMDs, New Komeito candidates in nine SMDs, and in
the last remaining district both parties supported a nominally independent candidate. Altogether 239
of the LDP candidates received official backing from New Komeito. In sum, electoral cooperation
between the two governing parties has come to function quite smoothly. On the contrary, electoral
cooperation between the opposition parties has made far less progress in the new millennium. In
2003, for example, DPJ and SDP candidates competed for votes in 41 SMDs. In all likelihood, uni-
fied candidacies would have brought them five more seats, which instead went to the governing par-
ties (Yomiuri Shinbun Tokyo Honsha Seron Chosabu Hensha 2004: 77–78). In addition, the JCP
insisted until 2003, as a matter of principle, on nominating candidates in all 300 SMDs—in spite of
not standing a chance of getting even a single candidate through.25
Under Koizumi, who in 2006 became Japan’s third-longest serving prime minister in the postwar
period, important changes with relevance for the executive dominance of the LDP have also taken
place. While party leaders before Koizumi either based their intra-party power on factional leadership or
were dependent on the support of faction leaders, Koizumi tried to keep the factions at bay (Kubota
2004: chap 8). He deliberately ignored the principle of proportional representation of intra-party
factions when putting together his cabinets and also in more recent reshuffles of the party executive.
Koizumi thus hastened the weakening of the LDP’s factions, which has resulted from the introduction
of political reforms in 1994 (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; The Japan Times, 26 June 2006: 1, 2).
Koizumi also tried to circumvent the traditional LDP decision-making process on material policy
by strengthening the role of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy set up by his predecessor
Mori and by relying on other advisory councils for policy input. More generally, the prime minister
was able to build on administrative reforms passed in 1999. These reforms beefed up the institutional
and personnel resources of the prime minister, inter alia, by way of establishing a new Cabinet
Office. As a consequence of these reforms and related legislative changes, the power base of the Jap-
anese prime minister has been broadened, and it has become easier for him in institutional terms to
exert political leadership (cf. Shinoda 2005; Ito 2006).
In connection with the strengthening of the resources of the prime minister, Koizumi also
attempted to wrest decision-making power from the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC),
the party’s ‘internal legislature’ (cf. Richardson 1997: 68–69). These attempts met with resistance
from the leaders of the party’s ‘policy tribes’ (zoku) who used to wield tremendous influence in their
respective policy areas. On a number of high-profile reform issues, Koizumi had to accept compro-
mises due to resistance from zoku (cf. Eda 2004; George Mulgan 2005: 289–290). Only in the first
few months after the electoral triumph of 2005 was Koizumi genuinely able to practise a centralized
top-down style of decision-making.
In the aftermath of the LDP’s victory in the 2005 election, Koizumi was also able to push through
a set of organizational reforms aimed at bringing about a more coherent governing party. These
.... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
24. According to a simulation of the Yomiuri Shinbun, such votes decided in up to 46 electoral districts between victory and
defeat, de facto enabling the LDP to remain the number-one party in Japan (Yomiuri Shinbun Tokyo Honsha Seron
Chosabu Hensha 2004: 70–74).
25. In 2005, the JCP did not present candidates in 25 districts (cf. Kabashima and Sugawara 2005: 116–117).
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reforms resulted, inter alia, in the abolishment of a number of PARC divisions and special com-
mittees and—more importantly—in limiting the terms of division heads to two years (Asahi
Shinbun, 8 November 2005: 4; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 10 November 2005: 2). The term limits
were aimed at further undermining the clout of zoku leaders. A significant number of well-known
zoku leaders had already retired from politics or had encountered electoral defeat during Koizumi’s
stint at the helm of the party. After more than four-and-a-half years of wrestling with zoku leaders
and other LDP Diet members opposing his policies, Koizumi finally managed to centralize deci-
sion-making on core issues to a degree unprecedented in the more recent history of Japan’s domi-
nant party (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 20 October 2005: 2). It is an open question though whether
his successors will be able to consolidate the gains made by Koizumi in terms of creating a more
coherent party. While Koizumi has been remarkably successful in terms of scaling back the power
of vested interests within his own party, it is not clear yet if and what kind of internal structures
and processes will get institutionalized to take on some of the functions formerly performed by
factions and policy tribes (Kobayashi 2005). Guaranteeing effective intra-party coordination and
minimizing intra-party conflicts will continue to top the list of challenges to maintaining the exec-
utive dominance of the LDP.
6. Conclusions
For the better part of the past 50 years, Japan’s Liberal Democrats have been fairly successful in
terms of mastering challenges in all three dimensions of party dominance. They adapted well to the
old electoral system, and they cultivated links with a host of interest groups. The LDP actively used
clientelistic instruments at the local and national levels to cement support but also introduced popu-
lar policies aimed at the broader public, especially when its rule was under threat. The party also ben-
efited from environmental conditions, including the fragmentation of the opposition and its failure
to cooperate more effectively in electoral terms. Increasingly institutionalized informal structures and
norms helped to contain intra-party dissent.
Since the early 1990s, however, a number of new challenges have arisen which threaten the domi-
nance of the LDP. In particular, the advantages of the old electoral system are gone for good.
Government turnovers have become easier. The oppositional DPJ has arguably developed into a serious
contender for power. Moreover, with Japan’s soaring public debt, the large-scale use of clientelism
has become increasingly unaffordable. Finally, the ability of the LDP’s national support groups to
mobilize votes has declined, whereas unaffiliated voters have become ever more important in elec-
toral terms. Faced with these new challenges, Prime Minister Koizumi managed to defend the elec-
toral dominance of the LDP by means of loosening existing clientelistic links and appealing instead
directly to voters on the basis of reform promises. He demonstrated an uncanny ability to instrumen-
talize the media, both old and new. Electoral cooperation with the New Komeito progressed quite
smoothly under Koizumi, contributing to the parliamentary dominance of the LDP. Last but not
least, Koizumi also rewrote the dynamics of executive dominance by moving the LDP in the direc-
tion of a more coherent party. He hastened the weakening of factions, scaled back the power of pol-
icy tribes, and also made the most of the new institutional resources that Japanese prime ministers
possess due to recent administrative reforms.
Yet it would not be prudent to assume that, as a consequence of the new approaches in the
Koizumi era, the LDP is destined to remain Japan’s ever-dominant party. The future of the LDP
depends on how it will continue to tackle the challenges in all three dimensions of dominance. In
more concrete terms: will the party be able to uphold its electoral dominance by offering attractive
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policy platforms and personnel? Or, will the party at least be able to frame electoral issues in a favour-
able way? Will the LDP be able to hold fast to core ‘vote banks’, and will it be able to retain the sup-
port of a sufficient percentage of Japan’s fickle unaffiliated voters? Conversely, can the DPJ
strengthen its claim to be a reliable alternative to the LDP and can it reconnect to its earlier successes
in winning over a substantial part of the ever more important group of unaffiliated voters? Will the
opposition parties be able to cooperate more effectively in national elections to break the parliamen-
tary dominance of the LDP? And with respect to the executive dominance of the LDP, will the coali-
tion with New Komeito, on whose vote mobilization efforts the LDP has increasingly become
dependent, hold? Or, will New Komeito at some point jump ship? And finally, will the LDP be able to
build on Koizumi’s ‘creative destruction’ of informal party institutions by establishing durable struc-
tures and mechanisms for maintaining party discipline and coherence? The answers to these questions
will determine to a large extent at what point the dominant status of the LDP will only be of interest
to future historians.
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